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ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT THROUGH
THE LENS OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES
(TTOS)
David Orozco *
Universities are unique environments that thrive on the research
and curiosity of faculty and students. To disseminate knowledge and
potentially derive lucrative sources of funding, universities have
aggressively entered the field of technology commercialization and
patenting. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental to
encourage this activity and the result has been an explosion of
university-related patenting. This activity comes at a social cost,
however, since patents restrict knowledge transfers and may create
deadweight losses. These costs are amplified if technology transfer
office (TTO) activities are viewed from a narrow financial or costbenefit viewpoint. As demonstrated in this study, twenty institutions
belong to an elite grouping of leader institutions that have
financially sustainable TTO operations. The rest are classified as
laggards and consistently operate with losses.
This article examines why the leaders excel and why the
laggards continue to support TTO activities when they present a
financial drain on universities. Transaction cost economics,
institutional theory, signaling, and expected value theory can all
offer insights related to the organization and maintenance of these
offices. These theoretical perspectives help to explain why
universities engage in technology transfer. An in-depth examination
of the highly successful Taxol case at Florida State University, a
Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Florida State University College of
Business. I greatly appreciate the feedback received from Eric Claeys, Dmitri
Karshtedt, Erica Leitzan, Brenda Simon, Adam Mossoff, Mark Schultz, Jay
Kesan, Michael Risch and Jonathan Barnett. Thanks also to the participants of the
2019 Western Academy of Legal Studies in Business Conference. This research
was generously supported by a Thomas Edison Research Fellowship awarded by
the George Mason Scalia Law School’s Center for the Protection of Intellectual
Property (CPIP).
*
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laggard institution, sheds light on some of the antecedents for a
successful, yet rare, technology transfer event. The case reinforces
the view that technology transfer should not be viewed narrowly,
even among laggard institutions, but rather it should be viewed as
a strategic endeavor that involves signaling, the observance of
social conventions and investment for broader technological and
economic objectives.
Two negative consequences have resulted despite the success of
Bayh-Dole. These include the increasingly predatory and
commercial behavior of universities and the highly-skewed
distribution of value among TTOs. If left unaddressed, these
problematic results may result in legislative reforms that could
weaken the ability of universities to practice technology transfer.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
University-based patenting and technology transfer have
received considerable attention due to several extraordinary success
stories. 1 Google, for example, offers a compelling university
technology transfer story. In that case, Sergei Brin and Larry Page’s
initial search and webpage ranking algorithm was patented by
Stanford University when this pair of enterprising doctoral students
1
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989)
(stating that “[t]he biotechnology revolution has accelerated the commercial
development of basic research discoveries and attracted commercial interest in
academic biomedical research in its early stages.”); Peter Lee, Patents and the
University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5 (2013); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 77, 109–115 (1999). Technology transfer, broadly construed, involves the
dissemination of technology to a third party. This can occur without patents such
as in the case of trade secret licensing or through more informal knowledgesharing methods such as publishing a paper or technical consulting. This article
focuses on technology transfer related to patent licensing within U.S. researchoriented universities and any references to technology transfer will pertain to this
more limited context, unless otherwise stated.
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were employed by the university. 2 This groundbreaking patent was
later licensed exclusively by Stanford to Google, the company
subsequently founded by Brin and Page with the backing of
investors to commercialize their patented webpage ranking
algorithm. 3 In exchange for a long-term exclusive license to the
patent, Google offered Stanford 1.8 million shares of Google stock. 4
Several other, more recent “blockbuster” examples of university
technology transfer include Northwestern University’s discovery of
pregabalin, marketed by Pfizer as Lyrica that resulted in $1.4 billion
in licensing income and New York University’s patents related to
the drug Remicade, which resulted in more than $1 billion in
royalties to the university. 5
As these cases demonstrate, the incentive for universities to
engage in technology transfer are powerful since the payoffs can be
remarkable. 6 These powerful incentives motivated universities to
devote significant attention and resources to costly technology
transfer activities, such as patenting and technology
commercialization. According to one survey by the Association of
University Technology Managers (AUTM), U.S. universities spent
a total of $368 million on legal patenting fees in just one year. 7
However, patents can be costly to society and universities since they
U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998).
Google’s webpage ranking algorithm patent was eventually integrated into a
viable business model that connected online search with paid advertising through
Google’s Adwords and Adsense programs. See Will Oremus, Google’s Big Break,
SLATE (Oct. 13, 2013), https://slate.com/business/2013/10/googles-big-breakhow-bill-gross-goto-com-inspired-the-adwords-business-model.html
[https://perma.cc/N297-L3VH].
4
BEST PRACTICES IN STATE AND REGIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES:
COMPETING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 226 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2013).
5
Richard Perez-Pena, Patenting Their Discoveries Does Not Pay Off for Most
Universities,
a
Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/education/patenting-their-discoveriesdoes-not-pay-off-for-most-universities-a-study-says.htm
[https://perma.cc/RZT7-2KGY].
6
WALTER D. VALDIVIA, BROOKINGS INST., UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL
FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1, 11 (2013) (“Stories of blockbuster
patents have fueled the ambition of TTO heads and university administrators
. . . .”).
7
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY 38 (2014).
2
3
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offer limited-life exclusivity rights and restrict the use of
technologies. 8 If patents prevent others from practicing an invention,
this can create a “deadweight loss” on society. 9 These societal losses
are so pronounced that universities that patent and aggressively
enforce their rights against others have even been described as
“patent trolls.” 10
The reality, however, is that research universities increasingly
devote substantial resources and employ on campus technology
transfer offices (TTOs) to handle the patenting and
commercialization of university-related inventions. 11 For many
years, the practice of patenting and commercialization was viewed
outside the purview of the research university’s ethical mission to
conduct basic research that should be offered unencumbered to the
See Ian Ayres & Lisa L. Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 271, 281 (2017) (stating that patents “create deadweight loss
because they are effective only to the extent they give patentees some market
power that allows prices to be raised above marginal cost”); see Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996)
(arguing that allowing private firms to hold exclusive patent rights requires the
public “to pay twice for the same invention-once through taxes to support the
research that yielded the invention, and then again through higher monopoly
prices and restricted supply when the invention reaches the market”); see Cristina
Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research After
Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1543 (2004) (discussing a
controversial federal appellate court decision whereby Duke University “would
not be entitled to rely on the experimental use defense if its use of the patented
materials was in furtherance of its ‘legitimate business objectives,’ which it
defined to include ‘educating and enlightening students and faculty,’ ‘increas[ing]
the status of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants.’”).
9
See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 281.
10
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611 (2008). In one recent high-profile example,
Carnegie Mellon University was awarded a $750 million dollar settlement to end
a patent dispute. See Joe Mullin, Marvell Agrees to Pay Record-Breaking $750M
to University to End Patent Lawsuit, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/marvell-will-pay-750m-to-carnegiemellon-university-in-massive-patent-settlement/
[https://perma.cc/9CQPCKEL].
11
Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 273 (“Today, every major U.S. research
institution has a technology transfer office . . . .”).
8
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public. 12 A tension arises since the appropriation and commercial
exploitation of intellectual property rights contravenes the basic
goals and tenets of open scientific research that most researchoriented universities support. 13 Compounding the problem of social
cost is the fact that few TTOs are profitable. 14 Year-after-year and
with few exceptions, TTOs draw scarce and valuable resources that
could be used to support other useful university-related activities
such as faculty research, scholarships, and instruction.
Technology transfer within universities was facilitated by the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 15 This federal statute gave
universities the right to own inventions supported with federal
research funds and grant exclusive licenses to these inventions. 16
This article will assess the efficacy of Bayh-Dole in light of the
Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2170
(2009) (stating that prior to 1980 “open science norms, along with the somewhat
complicated procedure of obtaining title to government-funded inventions, likely
resulted in a very low emphasis on patenting university research”); see also
ARCHIE M. PALMER, NONPROFIT RESEARCH AND PATENT MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 43–44 (1956) (“Most universities and other nonprofit research
organizations endeavor to avoid becoming involved in the intricate technical and
commercial aspects of patent management, mainly because they do not have the
personnel with the requisite specialized knowledge and experience . . . . When
patent protection is necessary, it is natural for educational institutions, as well as
other nonprofit research organizations, to make every effort to avoid becoming
directly involved in the intricate legal and commercial aspects of patent
management.”).
13
PALMER, supra note 12, at 5 (“Whether concerned primarily with search into
the unknown for a new idea, understanding of nature and its laws, solution of a
specific research problem, development of a new product or improvement of an
existing process, most scientists working in university laboratories and in
nonprofit research organizations are content to pursue their investigations without
giving much, if any, thought to the patentability of the results. Their research
efforts are directed primarily to the task at hand and many take the attitude that
wide dissemination of the results through publication is preferable.”).
14
VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 9.
15
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).
16
See DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVEN N. SAMPAT &
ARVIDS A. ZIEDONIS, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN
THE UNITED STATES 53 (2004); see also Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike:
Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act,
7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 398–99 (2006).
12

OCT. 2019]

University Technology Transfer

121

statute’s purpose, which is to stimulate greater technology
commercialization of federally-funded research. An impetus for the
passage of this law was to stimulate greater commercialization
efforts, particularly among universities, connect universities with
industry and generate greater funding for additional research. 17
Another ancillary goal of this legislation was to provide the public
with more benefits from university research through
commercialization. 18 The result after the statute’s passage was an
overall dramatic increase in university patenting. 19
To facilitate commercialization, universities delegated the
authority to manage university-owned intellectual property rights
internally to TTOs. These offices are typically comprised of
attorneys who specialize in licensing, contract-drafting, patenting
and commercialization efforts vis-a-vis third-party businesses
interested in licensing university-owned intellectual property.
Staffing TTOs within universities is a yearly expense that amounts
to several hundreds of thousands of dollars in addition to the legal
patenting costs incurred through the use of external patent counsel. 20
Despite the increased rate of patenting within academic
institutions, few TTOs generate enough revenue to offset their
expenses. 21 There are a few universities that earn a profit on
technology transfer and these are referred to as leaders in this article
since they persistently operate in a profitable manner. 22 Most
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 92–93.
See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 232 (2006); Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 97 (1999).
19
Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories:
California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1149
(2006); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities
Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV.
407, 419 (2007) (stating that between 1988–2003 patents assigned to universities
rose from 800 patents to 3,200).
20
At the author’s institution (Florida State University) the budget for the Office
of Technology Commercialization nears $500,000 a year. This does not factor the
considerable attorney’s fees spent every year to patent the university’s inventions.
21
Bagley, supra note 18, at 234; Valdivia, supra note 6, at 9.
22
See infra pp. 13–16.
17
18

122

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 1

university technology transfer activities create losses and thus most
universities fit within the category of laggards. 23
As explained below, the Bayh-Dole Act provided effective
property rights-based incentives to commercialize university
inventions. 24 The statute, however, failed to anticipate a challenge
facing TTOs in relation to the unique institutional setting of
academia. 25 Academic inventors generally have a different
perspective on innovation since they prioritize knowledge
dissemination under open science norms and rely on these norms to
further their research. 26 Academic inventors also place a greater
value on their status among academic peers and their reputation
through contributions to basic research that often involve
publications. 27 Academics respond to other strong incentives to
innovate such as tenure and promotion, awards and prestige. 28
Technology transfer offices, therefore, struggle to convince
academic inventors to employ the patent system since it often results
in agreements that restrict knowledge among the broader scientific
community. 29 For example, patents may prevent other scientists
23

Id.
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 357 (1967) (stating the “[t]he reduction in negotiating cost that
accompanies the private right to exclude others allows most externalities to be
internalized at rather low cost” and the Bayh-Dole Act greatly reduced the cost of
internalizing externalities by allowing exclusive licenses to be awarded).
25
See Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldmann, Entrepreneurial Universities and
Technology Transfer: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding KnowledgeBased Economic Development, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 175, 180 (2006) (“Faculty
members may not disclose, [inventions to a TTO] because they believe that
commercial activity is not appropriate for an academic scientist. This view
certainly represents the established norms of open academic science that favour
publication over patenting.”).
26
See Weschler, supra note 8, at 1545.
27
Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory:
Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 RES. POL’Y 914, 914
(2008).
28
See Lemley, supra note 10, at 621.
29
See Danny Hakim, Scientists Loved and Loathed by an Agrochemical Giant,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/
business/scientists-loved-and-loathed-by-syngenta-an-agrochemical-giant.html
[https://perma.cc/76XD-P5AG].
24
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from using technologies that are applicable to their fields of
research.
Scholars disagree about the merits of university-based
technology transfer. On one hand, some scholars believe that the
costs of patenting outweigh the benefits. 30 For these scholars, the
costs include the resources spent to patent and litigate these rights.
Also, their view is that the restrictions on technology use hinder
innovation and contribute to the tragedy of the commons. 31 The costs
extend beyond economics since the university culture, which is
based on knowledge sharing, transparency, and public welfare can
be damaged if too much emphasis is placed on private interests and
technology commercialization. 32 According to these scholars,
academic interests suffer when universities myopically focus on
licensing or revenue generation. 33
Other scholars disagree and view technology commercialization
as an overall benefit to society and universities. To these individuals,
See, e.g., Ted Agres, The Costs of Commercializing Academic Research:
Does University Licensing Impede Life Science Research and Development?,
SCIENTIST (Aug. 25, 2003), https://www.the-scientist.com/profession/the-costsof-commercializing-academic-research-51183 [https://perma.cc/28NU-8YC3]
(quoting Paul Berg, Director Emeritus, Beckman Center for Molecular and
Genetic Medicine, Stanford University); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public
Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004) (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act was “enacted to
promote technology transfer through licensing, and not specifically to enrich
universities”) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1996)); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting
Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 628 (2005); John M. Golden,
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and
Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 108–10 (2001).
31
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998)
(addressing the concern that an excess of rights in a resource could lead to
underuse).
32
See Kesan, supra note 12, at 2192 (“Scholars have also noted the danger of
possible interference with academic freedom and academic priorities.”).
33
See, e.g., Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property
Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 4
(2006); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008).
30
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the benefits that accrue from university patents outweigh the
substantial costs. 34 These benefits are measured as resources granted
to the university in terms of royalties and partnerships with industry.
The benefits also extend beyond the university as society benefits
from the application of new technologies and enterprises. For
example, a 2013 study found that universities had created 3,715
spin-off companies. 35 Also, entire industries such as biotechnology
have benefited greatly from university patent licensing under the
Bayh-Dole Act. 36 According to one source, nearly half of biotech
firms owe their genesis to university-related inventions. 37 These
measures indicate that social welfare is increased by university
technology transfer activities.
There is continuing debate concerning the overall social benefits
of Bayh-Dole, and finding an answer to this question depends to
some extent on how one defines the problem. If the issue is narrowly
defined as whether universities on average profit from patent
licensing, the answer is that university patenting is inefficient and
irrational. 38 On the other hand, if the issue is framed more broadly
as overall enterprise formation and royalty generation, the answer is
that technology transfer is efficient. The problem, however, is
distributional since very few universities can financially justify their

See generally Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson,
Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent
Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577–98 (1993); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to
Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); David C. Mowery et al., The
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the
Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99 (2001); Osenga, supra
note 19, at 418.
35
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2013).
36
See Mary Eberle, March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access
to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQUETTE INTELL. PROP. REV. 155, 155
(1999).
37
Bio Tech. Indus. Org., BIO 2009 Member Survey Technology Transfer & the
Biotechnology Industry (2009), https://www.bio.org/articles/bio-2009-membersurvey-technology-transfer-and-biotechnology-industry [https://perma.cc/Q6JU7V4M].
38
Valdivia, supra note 6, at 1.
34
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TTO-related expenses and this yields a winner-take-all type of
environment. 39
This article seeks to provide additional insights to the debate
concerning the efficacy of Bayh-Dole by addressing and answering
the following questions: 1) Which universities gain from technology
transfer? 2) Since technology transfer is narrowly defined as a losing
financial proposition at most institutions (even very well-funded
ones), why do so many universities engage in this behavior? 3) Is
university-based technology transfer desirable from a social welfare
perspective? 4) Should law and policy be calibrated to encourage or
rein in university-based technology transfer?
To answer these important questions, Part II of this article will
first examine the origins of the Bayh-Dole Act and how it impacted
university technology transfer practices. Part III will examine the
academic institutional setting of technology transfer. Part IV will
discuss the organizational attributes, success factors and obstacles
related to TTOs within universities. Data will be examined to
analyze the skewed distribution of successful technology transfer
cases at leader institutions. Several factors are analyzed to determine
the reasons why technology transfer at universities remains an
elusive prospect and why so many laggard institutions continue to
invest in this speculative and costly activity. In Part V, transaction
cost economics, institutional theory, signaling and expected value
theory will explain what seems like irrational behavior at laggard
universities. Part VI provides an in-depth case study analysis related
to Taxol, a successful and unique technology transfer event at
Florida State University. This case brings to light the relevant
antecedents and subsequent events that might follow a rare
technology transfer success at a laggard institution. Part VII will
discuss various legal and policy implications that arise from the
analysis.

39

Id. at 14.
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II. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN LIGHT OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
A. The Forces Behind the Passage of the Bayh-Dole Act
A principal goal for the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was to
stimulate greater commercialization efforts among universities,
connect universities with industry, and to generate greater funding
for research. 40 For example the statute states:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts;
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made
by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a
manner to promote free competition and enterprise . . . . 41

To achieve these goals the act stated that universities would be
authorized to patent and license federally-funded research. 42 From
the outset, universities played a major role in the sponsorship of the
Bayh-Dole Act. According to one scholar:
[a] number of universities, including Harvard University, Stanford
University, the University of California, and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, lobbied for passage of the bill, and throughout the
debates representatives of these and other research universities were
active in “commenting and helping to develop the final language” of the
House and Senate versions of the bill. 43

B. Technology Transfer Pre-Bayh-Dole
It is widely recognized that a singular moment for university
technology transfer was the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1981. 44
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 85–99.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994).
42
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).
43
DAVID C. MOWERY, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, 16
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 39, 50 (Gary D. Libecap ed.,
2005).
44
Kesan, supra note 12, at 2174 (“From a patent standpoint, the Bayh-Dole Act
was a very significant piece of legislation during the 1980s, because it led to an
increase in nonprofit organizations’ involvement in the patent system.”).
40
41
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This federal act gave universities the exclusive patent rights to own
inventions supported with federal research grants and the ability to
offer exclusive licenses to these patented inventions. 45 With the
exception of march-in rights retained by the federal government to
practice a patented technology without the owner’s permission,
universities could patent and grant exclusive licenses to inventions
funded with federal research grants. 46
A handful of universities had successfully experimented with
technology transfer prior to Bayh-Dole, for example: Stanford, MIT,
the University of Wisconsin, and Purdue. 47 The general trend among
state and private universities, however, was to increase technology
transfer before Bayh-Dole’s passage. 48 Other paths to deliver
knowledge and transfer technology were and continue to remain
important. For example, faculty publications, conference
presentations, consulting engagements, and informal meetings are
ways university scientists promote technology transfer without
patenting. 49 Most commentators, however, agree that the passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental in facilitating university
technology transfer and encouraged the explosive growth in
university patenting. 50
Universities were key stakeholders in the passage of the Act
even though university licensing has and remains controversial in
relation to open science norms. 51 This controversy dates back to
1933, when a report issued by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science discussed technology commercialization
Id. at 2174–75.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994).
47
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16.
48
See Scott Shane, Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of
the Bayh-Dole Act on University Patenting in the United States, 19 J. BUS.
VENTURING 127, 128–29 (2004).
49
See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1508
(2012); MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16.
50
Lee, supra note 1, at 64 (discussing in detail how university administrators
were involved throughout the Act’s genesis and passage); Ayres & Oullette, supra
note 8, at 272–73.
51
ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 464 (1973).
45
46
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by universities and concluded that “it is unethical for scientists or
professors to patent the results of their work.” 52
Dr. Harry Steenbock was a faculty member at the University of
Wisconsin and he played a critical role to help that university
establish the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the
university’s technology licensing arm in 1925. Dr. Steenbock helped
launch WARF by transferring his patents to enrich milk with
vitamin D. For many years Dr. Steenbock refused to receive
royalties on his patents since he believed it would ethically
compromise his position as an academic scientist. 53 In this way, Dr.
Steenbock illustrated the early and prevailing norm within
universities that sought to create a distance between the private
commercialization aims of patenting and the public mission of
university-related research activities.
C. Technology Transfer Post-Bayh-Dole
It is well-accepted that university patenting and technology
commercialization were on the rise prior to the Bayh-Dole Act. 54
Prior to the Act, federal agencies had increased their levels of
research funding and were looking for ways to commercialize
research activities by partnering with industry, universities, and
research institutes. For example, in 1986 Congress passed the
Technology Transfer Act. 55 This act mandated that federal agencies
with research programs take steps to transfer their technology for
commercialization. 56 This act notably authorized federal agencies to
enter into cooperative research and development agreements
(CRADAs) with external institutions, including universities. 57 A
JOSEPH ROSSMAN & AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., The
Protection by Patents of Scientific Discoveries, in 79 SUPPLEMENT TO SCIENCE 8
(1934).
53
Rima D. Apple, Patenting University Research: Harry Steenbock and the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 80 ISIS J. HIST. SCI. 374, 388 (1989).
54
Kesan, supra note 12, at 2177.
55
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–502, 100 Stat.
1785 (1986).
56
FRED E. GRISSOM JR. & RICHARD L. CHAPMAN, MINING THE NATION’S
BRAIN TRUST – HOW TO PUT FEDERALLY-FUNDED RESEARCH TO WORK FOR YOU
14 (1992).
57
Id. at 15.
52
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CRADA is a contract where an institution such as a corporation or
a university contributes its research expertise to a federal laboratory
to support an ongoing federal research program and obtains rights
in any resulting inventions. 58
Statistics support the argument that Bayh-Dole encouraged and
amplified the pre-existing positive trend of university patenting and
licensing. 59 Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, there were only a handful of
TTOs at universities, with several others outsourcing the function
altogether to third parties such as the privately-owned Research
Corporation. 60 Shortly after Bayh-Dole, almost all research
universities established TTOs, with the number increasing eightfold
to more than 200. 61 By 2005, the number of TTOs at universities,
hospitals, and research institutes totaled 3,300. 62 New patent
applications at universities have skyrocketed; an AUTM study
reported that in 2014, 15,953 new patent applications were filed by
universities. 63 Some of largest patentees belong to the TTO leader
category discussed below. For example, the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology obtained 360 patents in 2018. 64
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
This part provides the necessary background to examine
patenting and TTOs within a university context. As will be
demonstrated, the proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act failed to
anticipate the challenges of patenting in a university setting.
The backdrop of academic research and invention provides a
strikingly unique setting. Unlike private industry, academia has
various competing goals that can constrain technology
Thomas N. Bulleit Jr., Public-Private Partnerships in Biomedical Research:
Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising under the Federal Technology Transfer
Act of 1986, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2 (1989-90).
59
Kesan, supra note 12, at 2178.
60
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 58–85.
61
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2014).
62
Osenga, supra note 19, at 419.
63
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2015).
64
MIT Facts, MIT and Industry, MIT, https://web.mit.edu/facts/industry.html
[https://perma.cc/8CPL-SUQQ].
58
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commercialization. First, university research funding differs from
the private sector since a considerable portion of academic research
is funded through grants. 65 Once they secure a research grant,
university researchers do not have a strong incentive to secure a
patent. 66 In this context, funding is assured once the research grant
is approved. Commercialization efforts are, therefore, an
afterthought to this process.
The legal entity status of research-oriented universities supports
this paradigm since they are organized either as private non-profit
entities or public state-affiliated entities subject to legislative
oversight. Universities do not face the fiduciary decision-making
constraint to optimize wealth-maximization that is present in private
business. 67 Instead, universities view their primary mission as the
creation and dissemination of knowledge and in terms of advancing
public welfare. 68
There is also an inventor selection bias since academic
researchers are often drawn to university environments due to the
freedom they have to pursue general knowledge-related inquiries
traditionally labeled basic research. 69 This contrasts with most
industrial research settings that emphasize applied research and a

See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1726 (stating that “[p]atent revenues account
for a trivial fraction of overall university research budgets, while public research
funding remains of critical importance.”).
66
Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 283–84.
67
See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 632,
641–43 (1997) (“For-profit directors and officers are principally concerned about
long-term profit maximization, while nonprofit directors and officers, while
keeping economic matters in mind, are principally concerned about the effective
performance of the nonprofits’s mission.”).
68
Lee, supra note 1, at 5 (“Throughout most of the history of the patent system,
prudential interests in keeping foundational discoveries in the public domain as
well as judicial recognition of the noncommercial nature of university science
helped contribute to academic exceptionalism in patent doctrine.”).
69
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 20 (“Basic research involves a quest
for fundamental understanding. In the traditional natural sciences, such a quest
has often been identified with research with no immediate concern with practical
applications.”). The term basic research originated from VANNEVAR BUSH,
SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945).
65
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commercialization goal from the outset. 70 Some of the values
academic researchers ascribe to include reputation among the
scientific community, the prestige of academic research, making
contributions to general knowledge, and the open norms of
communicating and sharing research findings with other scientists. 71
The academic institutional setting encourages these values and
norms through its incentive system of tenure and promotion
awarded primarily for publications that generate basic research
findings and citations among academic researchers. Whereas patents
often play an important role in professional advancement within the
private sector, they are rarely used for promotion and tenure
purposes at leader or laggard universities. 72 To the contrary,
academic prestige and promotion may be hindered if an academic
researcher spends too much time and effort patenting their
research. 73
The distinctions among research orientation and motivations are
visually captured in the matrix known as the Stokes Classification
of Scientific Research. 74 This matrix represented as Figure 1
classifies research along two dimensions: considerations of use and
the quest for basic knowledge. If an inventor does not emphasize use
considerations (the applied nature of technology) and is motivated
by a quest for basic understanding they fit within the pure basic
research, or Bohr’s quadrant. If the inventor has a quest for basic
research and is interested in the applied aspects of technology they
fit within the use-inspired basic research quadrant, also known as
70
There are a few notable exceptions, such as the case of AT&T’s famous Bell
Labs. The research team at Bell Labs developed a significant body of applied and
basic research that eventually yielded some break-through innovations and major
contributions to science. Eight Nobel Prizes were awarded for work completed at
Bell Labs. See Robert Buderi, Bell Labs is Dead, Long Live Bell Labs, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 1 1998), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400241/bell-labs-isdead-long-live-bell-labs/ [https://perma.cc/M34A-EJL2].
71
MERTON, supra note 51.
72
Charles A. Garris Jr., The U.S. Patent System: An Essential Role in
Engineering Design Education, 90 J. ENGINEERING EDUC. 509, 521 (2001).
73
See David Blumenthal et al., Participation of Life-Science Faculty in
Research Relationships with Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1734, 1738 (1996).
74
DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT—BASIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 72 (1997).
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Pascal’s quadrant. Lastly, if an inventor does not have a quest for
basic understanding and is solely motivated by the applied aspects
of technology they fit within the pure applied research, also known
as Edison’s quadrant. Most academic inventors prefer to pursue
research within Bohr’s quadrant, which prioritizes the quest for
basic understanding and minimizes practical use considerations.
Industry, on the other hand, typically hires and rewards researchers
who prioritize use considerations, or those who fall within Edison’s
quadrant. 75
Figure 1. The Stokes Classification of Research
Considerations of Use?

Yes
Quest for Basic
Understanding?
No

No

Yes

Pure Basic
Research
(Bohr)

Use-Inspired
Basic Research
(Pascal)
Pure Applied
Research
(Edison)

An academic inventor who collaborates with a university to
achieve a successful technology transfer event such as patent
licensing would likely fit within Pascal’s quadrant since they will
pursue a combination of basic and applied research. TTOs often
struggle to find and sustain the conditions that nurture the type of
academic researcher who fits within Pascal’s research quadrant. 76

Even within the quadrants there is variance among inventors. For example,
some highly innovative companies like Google seek out “T-shaped” engineers
who have deep levels of expertise within a narrow domain and broad general
knowledge across multiple domains. This is viewed as an indicator of curiosity,
out-of-the-box thinking and the potential to develop breakthrough innovations.
See JOE TRANQUILLO, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC., THE T-SHAPED
ENGINEER: CONNECTING THE STEM TO THE TOP 11 (June 2013).
76
See Vinit Nijhawan, Maximize Collisions, Minimize Friction: Applying
Platform Strategies to Accelerate University Research Commercialization, 19
TECH. & INNOVATION 415, 416 (2017).
75
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Industry’s approach towards knowledge-based rights differ from
academia. In industry, knowledge is commoditized and protected as
property to restrict knowledge dissipation and protect costly
investments in research and development. 77 Free-riding and
imitation by rivals is viewed as a major threat that prevents firms
from achieving competitive advantage. 78 Industry, therefore, relies
to a great extent on various property, contract, and litigation
mechanisms to appropriate knowledge for private advantage. 79
Trade secrets, patents, know-how, copyrights, designs, and
trademarks are used increasingly by firms to protect knowledgebased assets. 80 Contracts such as non-disclosure, non-solicitation,
and non-compete agreements are also used to expand the protection
of these knowledge-based rights. 81 Patent litigation in the
commercial sector has also risen dramatically in the past few years. 82
Industry’s approach clashes with the open science norms
favored by academia. Universities today, however, seek to obtain
trademark and patent rights more so than in the past. 83 Their aims,
however, are still primarily to serve the public. 84 Restrictive
knowledge contracts such as non-competes are, therefore, relatively
rare in academia. Industry support of academic invention is
encouraged, although it may lead to conflicts since the research
findings may be constrained by contractual devices such as
confidentiality agreements. 85
See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory
to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. LAW. J. 979, 979
(2012).
78
See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J.
MGMT. 99, 103–05 (1991). See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY (1980).
79
Bishara & Orozco, supra note 77, at 996.
80
See generally DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRATEGIC AND POLICY DIMENSIONS (2002).
81
Bishara & Orozco, supra note 77, at 988.
82
See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 402 (2013).
83
Jacob H. Rooksby, University TM: Trademark Rights Accretion in Higher
Education, 27 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 349, 349 (2014).
84
James K. Woodell & Tobin L. Smith, Technology Transfer for All the Right
Reasons, 18 TECH. & INNOV. 295, 300 (2017).
85
Hakim, supra note 29.
77
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Universities may not be financially motivated, yet they face
increasing pressure to demonstrate that they are good stewards of
scarce research funding awarded by state agencies, private industry
grants, donations, and legislative appropriations. The competition
for scarce funding and reduced appropriations for state universities
has invariably forced universities to find ways to invest in research
that yields measurable benefits to society and provides a financial
return to the university. For example, in Florida, a metric the
legislature uses to determine university funding includes the number
of patents awarded every year to state universities. 86 Given the
considerable financial rewards that can accrue from patent licensing,
university administrators view technology transfer as a lucrative
source of funding that also yields prestige. 87 That explains, to some
degree, the dramatic rise in patenting and commercialization efforts
at universities, as discussed in the next section.
IV. UNIVERSITY TTOS AS COMMERCIALIZATION AGENTS
Universities responded to the Bayh-Dole Act by establishing
TTOs to commercialize university inventions. This part examines
the practices, differential groupings of leaders and laggards, and the
growth related to the activities of these specialized on-campus units.
A. The Goals and Organizational Structures of TTOs and Research
Foundations
The mission of most TTOs is to broadly support the university’s
research efforts rather than a narrow commercialization focus.
According to a former TTO director, the central mission of the TTO
he helped launch in 1987 was to advance three interrelated goals. 88
First, since the federal government sponsored considerable sums for
research, he viewed it as an obligation to translate that research into

86
FLA. STAT. § 1001.7065 (2017) (“The following academic and research
excellence standards are established for the preeminent state research universities
program . . . [o]ne hundred or more total patents awarded by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office for the most recent 3-year period.”).
87
Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 295–96.
88
Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, Former Dir. of Tech.
Commercialization, Fla. St. U. (Oct. 2, 2017).
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inventions that could benefit society. 89 In his view, the TTO office
could play an integral role since it could incentivize the academic
inventor to that end. 90 Second, technology commercialization could
generate novel and additional research inquiries that the academic
inventor did not initially realize. 91 Third, funds generated from
technology transfer could be applied to support additional research
activities within the university. 92
Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, universities seldom managed their
patenting and licensing activities in-house. 93 Instead, they
outsourced this activity to independent foundations or holding
companies to avoid the criticism and litigation that might arise from
managing patents for financial gain. 94 The prevailing cultural norm
in academia was to view the practice of patenting and licensing
university research as an unethical activity. 95
According to one TTO director, separate research foundations
help to alleviate concerns since they create a distance between the
university and the research foundation as the patent owner. 96 This is
particularly true at state universities, which benefit from having a
separate legal entity to bypass state regulations that could impede or
delay equity investments in startups and financing projects such as
infrastructure or capital improvements. 97 The pioneer in this regard
was the University of Wisconsin, which created the Wisconsin
Id. According to one estimate, the federal government spent forty billion
dollars in 2014 to support research at universities, hospitals and research
institutions. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY
(2014).
90
Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 38.
94
Id. Some universities clearly are not deterred by the public criticism they may
engender for aggressively litigating patent rights. WARF at the University of
Wisconsin and Carnegie Mellon have recently been in the spotlight for their
aggressive patent litigation tactics and the substantial windfalls these have
generated.
95
JOSEPH ROSSMAN, AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., THE PROTECTION
BY PATENTS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 8 (1934).
96
Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, Dir. of Tech. Commercialization,
Fla. St. U. (Nov. 21, 2017).
97
PALMER, supra note 12, at 46.
89
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Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) in the 1920s to
commercialize academic inventions related to a method for
increasing the content of vitamin D in food. 98 To this day, the
organizational model WARF pioneered has been replicated across
various universities. 99
Following the model pioneered by WARF, university research
foundations are structured as separate legal entities, typically nonprofit corporations, charged by their corporate charters to broadly
support university research. 100 Although research foundations are
separate legal entities, their oversight can include representation
from high-ranking university administrators. 101 In the case of the
more successful programs, the boards of these foundations comprise
Apple, supra note 53, at 390.
Id.
100
For example, the Florida State University Research Foundation’s articles of
incorporation describes its purpose as:
This corporation is organized and shall be operated exclusively for scientific and
educational purposes and not for pecuniary profit. The corporation shall be
operated exclusively for the benefit of The Florida State University. The
Corporation is a university direct-support organization within the definition of
Section 240.299, Florida Statutes, and as such is organized and operated
exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make
expenditures to or for the benefit of The Florida State University or for the benefit
of a research and development authority affiliated with The Florida State
University and organized under Part V of Chapter 159 of Florida Statutes. The
purposes of this corporation include the promotion and encouragement of, and
assistance to, the research and training activities of faculty, staff, and students of
The Florida State University through income from contracts, grants, and other
sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from or related to the
development and commercialization of University work products. The
corporation shall provide means by which discoveries, inventions, processes, and
work products of faculty, staff, and students of the University may be patented,
developed, applied, and utilized in order that the results of such research shall be
made available to the public and that funds be made available from such
discoveries, inventions, processes, and work products for further research at The
Florida State University.
Articles of Incorporation of the Florida State University Research Foundation,
Inc., Art. III, https://www.research.fsu.edu/media/1556/articles-of-incorporationas-amended-by-bod-2-16-00-bor-5-17-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6M5-TLL5].
101
Id. at Art. VII (stating the university president, vice-president for research,
provost, and dean of arts and sciences must be on the board of the research
foundation).
98
99
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successful individuals and alumni with expertise in the areas of
investments, technology, and business administration. 102 University
research foundations hold legal title to university-created
intellectual property, sign license agreements as the licensors,
financially manage the funds associated with royalties, manage
equity investments in university-related start-ups, finance university
capital spending projects, and administer private research grants. 103
They also develop policies for disbursing funds generated from
these activities back to the university to support additional researchrelated goals and activities. The individuals who manage and
generate patent commercialization opportunities, however,
generally reside within distinct organizational units known as
TTOs. 104
B. The Process of University Technology Transfer
This section offers an overview and analytical break-down of the
major steps and actors involved in a technology transfer event. The
key university technology transfer mechanisms involve licensing
agreements with private firms and university-based start-ups. 105
The process begins when an academic inventor such as a
doctoral student or professor fills out an invention disclosure form
if they believe they have developed a technology that has
commercial viability. 106 The TTO reviews these forms and screens
them to assess which ones have the greatest potential for success.
Typically, if the university passes on the invention, the rights belong
102
For example, the WARF Board of Trustees is largely comprised of alumni
who have achieved distinction in business. WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH
FOUNDATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES, https://www.warf.org/about-us/board-oftrustees/board-of-trustees.cmsx [https://perma.cc/9KTM-3QGS] (last visited
Sept. 15, 2019).
103
PALMER, supra note 12, at 46.
104
See Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs:
Organizational Change at the Individual Level, 19 ORG. SCI. 69, 70 (2008)
(discussing how the invention disclosure process begins when a faculty member
consults with the TTO).
105
Phillip H. Phan & Donald S. Siegel, The Effectiveness of University
Technology Transfer: Lessons Learned, Managerial and Policy Implications, and
the Road Forward, SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 3 (Apr. 2006).
106
See Bercovitz & Feldman, supra note 104, at 70.
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to the inventor to independently pursue patenting or
commercialization. 107
If the TTO believes the invention disclosure has
commercialization potential they will finance the patenting process.
Typically, university policies for inventions allocate a significant
royalty to the academic inventor that is preset by the employment
contract. At the author’s institution, an academic inventor receives
40 percent of royalties, which is in line with other research-intensive
universities. 108 During, or after the patenting stage, the TTO will
attempt to market the technology and find a suitable licensee or
commercialization partner. If a suitable partner is found, a licensing
agreement is drafted and negotiated that includes an initial term
sheet with the most important negotiated items. 109 Following these
negotiations, a fully executed license agreement will then be signed
by the university, typically the university research foundation, as the
licensor.
In some circumstances, a start-up entity called a spin-off will be
created for the sole purpose of commercializing the technology. 110
In these cases, it may be that the academic inventor takes on a
leadership or consulting role within the new start-up enterprise. 111
These steps are identified as a process flow diagram below in Figure
2.
The policies at many universities allow the university to release the patent
rights to the academic inventor. For example, at Florida State University the
university may waive its rights to the invention. See FLORIDA STATE UNIV. –
OFFICE OF COMMERCIALIZATION, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY INVENTION
DISCLOSURE FORM 4, https://www.research.fsu.edu/media/4783/inventiondisclosure-form-blank.pdf.
108
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND THE UNITED FACULTY OF FLORIDA GENERAL FACULTY
BARGAINING UNIT 2016–2019 1, 79 (2016).
109
See Valdimir Drozdoff & Darly Fairbairn, Licensing Biotech Intellectual
Property in University-Industry Partnerships, 2015 COLD SPRING HARBOR
PERSP. MED. 1, 4–6 (2015).
110
SCOTT SHANE, ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 173 (2004) (stating that 14
percent of the time, new ventures are created to exploit university intellectual
property and that it is important to note that university spinoff companies are
atypical examples of start-up companies).
111
Id. at 151–164.
107
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Figure 2.

C. Internal TTO Challenges
As discussed above, TTOs face significant challenges due to
academia’s open science norms. 112 The following constraints create
additional hurdles for TTOs.
1.

Weak Incentives and Human Capital Deficits
Patents can yield strong exclusionary property rights to the
owner. 113 The incentives offered to the TTO staff, however, are
generally quite weak. This is particularly true of programs that fall
outside of the leader programs. 114 For example, licensing managers
at most TTOs share no financial reward in the exploitation of patents
through licensing. According to one TTO director, very few TTOs
have a bonus system for their employees. 115 The main financial
benefits accrue to the university and the academic inventor through
royalties. In industry, on the other hand, inventors and managers
often obtain bonuses and promotions for patents that yield
commercialization. 116
See, e.g., Fabrizio & Di Minin, supra note 27.
Ayres & Ouellete, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the social costs of patents
that offer market power).
114
For example, a public record search revealed that the annual salary of David
Day, former TTO Director at the University of Florida (an AAU member
institution and a leader TTO) totaled $285,022. This compares the $109,191
yearly salary of the TTO Director at Florida State University (not an AAU
member institution and a laggard TTO). FLORIDA HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW, Florida
State University System Employee Salaries, https://prod.flbog.net:4445/pls/
apex/f?p=140:1 [https://perma.cc/ECK5-DF2Q].
115
Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96.
116
DONAL O’CONNELL, INSIDE THE PATENT FACTORY – THE ESSENTIAL
REFERENCE FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF PATENT CREATION
106 (2008).
112
113
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Weak incentives within organizations create a human capital
deficit. 117 Under classical economic theory, rational agents seek to
maximize their utility.118 Accordingly, the more talented and
entrepreneurial licensing managers will seek greater financial
rewards and employment elsewhere, likely in private industry or
within leader TTOs. Thus, weak incentives often result in laggard
institution TTOs with human capital deficits and that function
bureaucratically rather than entrepreneurially. 119
The staff at laggard TTOs are mainly comprised of attorneys
who emphasize legal processes and formalities centered around
patenting rather than the deal-making or value creation process. 120
Many of these attorneys also lack business or entrepreneurial
experience. 121 The management of patents for commercialization
and strategic advantage, however, requires a very different skill set
that is more attuned to entrepreneurialism, technology marketing,
and negotiations. 122 According to one scholar, “TTOs should
augment their legal expertise with persons possessing marketing,
development, and entrepreneurial experience who can help develop
long-term relationships with commercial partners and mediate
potential conflicts.” 123
Several internal characteristics of TTOs impact the likelihood of
developing a pipeline and trajectory of successful licensing. For
example, researchers have measured the business and marketing
expertise of TTO personnel as a determinant of technology transfer
117
See Michael A. Hitt et al., Direct and Moderating Effects of Human Capital
on Strategy and Performance in Professional Service Firms: A Resource-Based
Perspective, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 13–28 (2001) (discussing how human capital
is expensive for firms to maintain).
118
James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Toward a
Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 22 (1997).
119
According to one TTO director, many TTOs are bureaucratic versus
entrepreneurial. Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96.
120
Osenga, supra note 19, at 428.
121
Id. at 425–26.
122
E.g., Gary P. Pisano & David J. Teece, How to Capture Value from
Innovation: Shaping Intellectual Property and Industry Architecture, 50 CAL
MGMT. REV. 278, 282–83 (2007); Markus Reitzig, How Executives Can Enhance
IP Strategy and Performance, 49 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 38–43 (2007).
123
Lee, supra note 49, at 1562.
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success and found a positive correlation. 124 Stanford, for example, is
a leader institution and has a very successful track record of
commercializing university research. 125 Stanford adopted a unique
model with respect to the internal staffing capabilities of its TTO.
According to one source, the genesis of Stanford’s unique model
originated with Niels Reimers, the founder of its TTO in 1968. 126
Reimers’ unique approach focused on marketing and business
development rather than on the administrative and legal formalities
of patenting. 127 He staffed his TTO with individuals skilled in
technology evaluation and marketing rather than the attorneys that
traditionally staff the TTOs at most laggard institutions.128
Stanford’s former President John Hennessey noted that the
university’s success in technology transfer resulted from its
technology transfer office’s willingness to take risks and to move
technology quickly from the lab to the marketplace as opposed to
narrowly focusing on drafting licensing arrangements aimed at
maximizing royalty revenue. 129
2.

The Absence of Complementary Assets and Capabilities
TTOs lack the traditional strategic complementary assets that
companies possess such as logistics, manufacturing, sales,
marketing, and distribution. 130 Private research and development
(R&D) is integrated into an existing value ecosystem that tailors
inventions within that system. 131 This results in internal intellectual
Id.; see also Andy Locket & Mike Wright, Resources, Capabilities, Risk
Capital and the Creation of University Spin-Out Companies, 34 RES. POL’Y
1043–57 (2005); Donald S. Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact of Organizational
Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices:
An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27–48 (2003).
125
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 45.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 297.
130
David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285,
288–90 (discussing the various strategic complementary assets required to profit
from innovation).
131
See Shane, supra note 48, at 130–31 (“Universities differ from private firms
in the ways in which they can appropriate private economic returns from the
124

142

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 1

property management and strategic decision-making capabilities
that enable companies to focus on the commercial aspects of R&D
within a company’s business model. 132 This leads to activities such
as: joint ventures, patent continuations, strategic patent landscaping,
patent fencing, patent acquisitions, and cross-licenses to extract
value from patenting. 133 Universities, on the other hand, often have
to rely on an external licensee to locate the business opportunity or
“white space” and refine the technology to reach its full commercial
potential. 134 As stated by one TTO director “[w]e don’t know what’s
going to be a success. The companies are responsible for product
development and distribution.” 135 The inability to tailor R&D
investments to an existing value ecosystem places TTOs in a
difficult situation since they must convince partners in industry of
the largely uncertain and unproven merits of university
technologies. 136
D. University TTO Leaders
When one looks at the aggregate licensing statistics, the
argument can be made that the Bayh-Dole Act increased social
welfare if the assumption holds true that these licenses would not
have been executed without patent rights to spur commercialization.
For example, one study provided by the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM) estimates that yearly licenses total
nearly eight thousand and amount to $2.7 billion a year in royalty
revenues. 137 A large portion of those royalties, however, are derived
from a few sizeable inventions at a handful of academic institutions.
invention of new technology. Universities do not manufacture goods or provide
services other than education, making it difficult for them to profit financially
from inventions that must be incorporated into products or services before they
can be sold.”).
132
Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary
Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293,
293–308 (2006).
133
See Robert C. Bird & David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal
Strategy, 56 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 81, 81–90 (2014).
134
Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88.
135
Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96.
136
Shane, supra note 48, at 130.
137
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2010).
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The concentration is largely the effect of a few blockbuster cases.
For example, in 2010 the top fifteen university TTOs generated 52%
of all the licensing revenues among 155 universities sampled. 138
Tables 1 and 2 identify the fifteen highest earning university TTOs
in 2010 and 2014.
Table 1. Top Fifteen TTO programs in 2010139
1. Northwestern University

$180 million

2. New York University

$178 million

3. Columbia University

$147 million

4. University of California System

$104 million

5. Wake Forest University

$86 million

6. University of Minnesota

$84 million

7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

$69 million

8. University of Washington

$69 million

9. Stanford University

$65 million

10. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation

$54 million

11. California Institute of Technology

$52 million

12. University of Rochester

$42 million

13. University of Massachusetts

$40 million

14. University of Michigan

$40 million

15. University of Texas System

$38 million

138
139

Id.
Id. Data compiled by the author from this source.
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Table 2. Top Fifteen TTO programs in 2014 140
1. New York University

$211 million

2. Columbia University

$164 million

3. Princeton University

$135 million

4. University of Washington

$96 million

5. University of California System

$74 million

6. Stanford University

$72 million

7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

$40 million

8. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation

$38 million

9. University of Texas System

$32 million

10. University of Florida

$29 million

11. University of Massachusetts

$28 million

12. University of Illinois Chicago

$27 million

13. University of Pittsburgh

$27 million

14. Duke University

$25 million

15. University of Rochester

$22 million

From a purely financial perspective, successful TTOs are those
that consistently show profitability. These TTOs have been
described as belonging to a select club. 141 For purposes of this study,
leader TTOs are defined as the universities that have reached the top
twenty in licensing revenue at least five times during the most recent
ten-year reporting period. Everyone else is referred to as a laggard
institution. The leaders according to this definition are listed in
Table 3.

ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2014). Data
compiled by the author from this source.
141
VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 6.
140
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Table 3. The Leader Institutions
New York University
Columbia University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Northwestern University
University of California System
University of Washington
Stanford University
University of Massachusetts
University of Minnesota
University of Wisconsin
University of Rochester
University of Utah
University of Florida
University of Colorado
California Institute of Technology
Emory University
University of Michigan
Harvard University
University of Iowa
Wake Forest University
Several successful TTO programs are not included in the leader
category since they were included in a top twenty grouping due to a
rare blockbuster event. This can skew the results and mask the fact
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that the program is not sustainable over the long term. 142 To avoid
this over-inclusive sampling bias, a program has to have a greater
than fifty percent chance of being listed in the top twenty ranking
within the past ten years. The leaders are thus programs that
continually run successful TTO programs and do not rely on the rare
and infrequent blockbuster event.
V. TTO BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED
This part offers a theoretical justification to explain why laggard
institutions engage in technology transfer if it is so costly and the
payoffs are so uncertain. The Bayh-Dole Act encouraged a dramatic
increase in university patenting. The sponsors of that statute did not
contemplate, however, that most of this patenting activity would
yield losses for the vast majority of universities. On the surface,
university patenting resembles a lottery, which from an economic
standpoint is irrational behavior. 143 The justification for maintaining
a TTO does not exist if technology transfer is viewed solely in terms
of revenues versus costs. Instead, laggard TTOs are influenced by
signaling, social pressures explained by institutional theory, the
expected value of achieving a blockbuster technology transfer event
and positive spillover effects.
A. Transaction Cost Economics
Under the classic make-or-buy scenario, established transaction
cost economics theory suggests that if transaction costs are high,
universities will not contract with third parties and will buy or
insource patent commercialization activities. 144 Transaction costs in
the TTO context include title, search, and enforcement costs. Title
costs were substantially decreased after the Bayh-Dole Act since
See infra pp. 31–38. For example, Florida State University was ranked in the
top twenty a few years due to the major success of Taxol; however, this proved to
be a rare event.
143
Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 71, 75–79 (1994).
144
Id.; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1661 (2009).
142
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that Act clarified ownership and licensing of university-related
patents. 145 Search costs include the costs of finding appropriate
inventions, that is, academic inventors who provide promising
invention disclosures and suitable licensees who will commercialize
the technology. In many respects, TTO offices function as
matchmakers between academic inventors and commercial
enterprises. Enforcement costs relate to policing a licensee’s
compliance through royalty audits and the pursuit of litigation in
cases where an infringer refuses to pay a license.
Litigation costs are not prohibitive since they are largely a
function of attorney’s fees and are well-known in advance. The
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) surveys
patent-related litigation costs every year. 146 Although patent
litigation is an expensive process, the costs are well-defined a priori
and rational economic decisions can be made in relation to whether
it is efficient to pursue litigation against infringers. 147 Since title and
See Lee, supra note 49, at 1512 (“As a general matter, one could characterize
the Bayh-Dole Act and the rise of university patenting as attempts to facilitate
market-based transfer of academic technologies to the private sector for
commercialization.”); Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration that
Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the
Public Interest, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 378 (2000) (“Until the passage of the
Act, universities were forced to deal with a myriad of different policies regarding
research funding and ownership of inventions. In total, twenty-six different
agency regulations existed, all of them presumptively granting the government
title to federally funded inventions. It was difficult, time-consuming, and risky for
universities to overcome the presumptions of federal title.”).
146
Proceeding to a jury verdict is notoriously expensive. For example,
according to the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the
average cost of a jury trial for a patent infringement lawsuit ranges between
$970,000 and $5.9 million, depending on the amount of damages at stake. 2013
Report of the Economic Survey, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (2013),
https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2013-report-of-the-economic-survey
[https://perma.cc/B373-NJXX].
147
For example, the market for financing commercial litigation in general has
evolved into a highly specialized and sophisticated specialty area of finance. See
Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455,
460–61 (2012) (discussing how litigation financing “relates to the funding of
business disputes, such as disputes relating to intellectual property, antitrust,
business contracts, and international commercial and investment arbitration
brought by sophisticated parties and involving larger stakes”).
145
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litigation costs are well-defined and not prohibitively expensive,
universities outsource the ownership and litigation of university
patents to third parties, namely university research foundations
organized as separate legal entities. Search costs, however, remain
high and uncertain since universities are in the best position to find
the academic inventors who will submit promising invention
disclosures and commercial licenses. As predicted by transaction
cost economics theory, this function is largely insourced by the
university through its TTO.
Transaction cost economics is a useful theory to explain the
emergence of TTOs and research foundations since each
organizational entity addresses a different aspect of university
patenting and the related transaction costs. Although it is a useful
theory, transaction cost economics does not explain why laggard
institutions continue to engage in technology transfer efforts when
on average they sustain considerable losses every year. 148
B. Institutional Theory and Signaling
Institutional theory explains what seems like irrational behavior
incentivized by the Bayh-Dole Act. This theory recognizes that
organizations operate within a social framework of norms, values,
and assumptions regarding what constitutes acceptable modes of
economic behavior. 149 This theory posits that motives of human
behavior extend beyond economic optimization to include social
justification and social obligation. 150 A central question institutional
148
But see Lee, supra note 49, at 1535. Professor Lee argues that technology
transfer is explained by the tacit knowledge that must be transferred between the
inventor and the licensee. The relational nature of technology transfer, he argues,
explains why so few TTOs are not outsourced but are instead insourced. This is
in line with transaction cost economics since the highly personal nature of
contracting tacit knowledge increases transaction costs and leads to insourcing.
This article agrees with Professor Lee’s conclusions; however, it brings to light
the institutional theory aspects that help explain why universities sustain TTOrelated losses year-after-year.
149
See generally Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage:
Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697,
697–713 (1997); Bercovitz & Feldman, supra note 25, at 181.
150
STRUCTURES OF CAPITAL: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
1–37 (Sharon Zukin & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1990).
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theorists ask is: ‘Why do so many organizations act and look the
same?’ 151 Institutional isomorphism, or the processes in which
organizations resemble one another, helps to explain similarities
across institutions. 152 Universities exhibit traits of institutional
isomorphism, whereby the laggard organizations mimic the
behavior of a select group of leader programs to achieve legitimacy,
even if these activities routinely create losses. There are three main
types of institutional isomorphism identified in the organizational
behavior literature: normative, coercive, and mimetic. 153 Normative
isomorphism involves professional standards that result in
uniformity. 154 Coercive isomorphism refers to formal and informal
pressures that originate from non-professional actors, such as
regulators and policymakers. 155 Mimetic isomorphism occurs when
organizations mimic others to reduce risk and uncertainty. 156 All
three explain the seemingly irrational persistence of TTOs within
laggard institutions after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
1.

Normative Isomorphism
Laggard TTOs face normative isomorphism due to the
aspirational goals reflected within university associations and
standards. Since some universities have successful leader TTOs, the
argument is laggard universities should likewise have TTOs, if
anything just to resemble the elite group they aspire to join. Whereas
TTOs, such as WARF, originally emerged from the entrepreneurial
efforts of key individuals, university administrators today face
pressure from within their professional communities, that is other
universities, to normatively adopt these structures.
Normative pressure stems from the fact that most leader
universities belong to the prestigious American Association of
Universities (AAU). Seventeen of the twenty leader TTOs (85%)
listed in Table 3 are housed within universities that belong to the
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48
AM. SOC. REV. 147, 148 (1983).
152
Id. at 149.
153
Id. at 150.
154
Id. at 152.
155
Id. at 150.
156
Id. at 151.
151
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AAU. 157 This group comprises the elite grouping of research
universities in the U.S. and Canada and virtually every researchoriented university aspires to join this cadre. 158 The AAU recognizes
the impact of technology transfer and takes an active leadership role
in this area, disseminating best practices and policy objectives. 159
Universities that seek to belong to this elite group will seek to
resemble AAU institutions and will devote significant resources to
technology transfer every year, even if these activities are not
financially viable.
2.

Coercive Isomorphism
TTOs remain prevalent at laggard institutions due to coercive
isomorphism. 160 Coercive isomorphism occurs when pressures to
persist and conform arise outside of any professional associations. 161
In the case of TTOs, this pressure arises from governmental and
regulatory sources. This source of pressure is considerable since the
federal government provides $32 billion worth of research funding
every year. 162 Federal acts and congressional oversight hearings
signal the importance of public accountability through highly visible
statements from public officials that favor technology
All of the universities listed in Table 3 belong to the AAU, except the
University of Massachusetts, University of Utah and Wake Forest University.
ASS’N OF AM. U., AAU MEMBER U., https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/
AAU-Files/Who-We-Are/AAU-Member-Universities--Admission-Year.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HX93-5RW4].
158
Membership into the AAU is by invitation-only and the group comprises a
select group of elite universities. Membership in the AAU is a great point of
distinction and helps to drive rankings. See Phyllis V. Larsen, Academic
Reputation: How U.S. News & World Report Survey Respondents Form
Perceptions, 4 CASE INT’L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 155, 159 (2003) (discussing
how membership in the AAU helps respondents in a ranking survey to determine
the academic reputation of a university).
159
ASS’N of AM. U., AAU TECH. TRANSFER WORKING GROUP STATEMENT ON
MANAGING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(2015), https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-technology-transfer-working-groupstatement-managing-university-technology-transfer
[https://perma.cc/AGH3KWS5].
160
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 151.
161
Id.
162
VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 4.
157
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commercialization. 163 Legislation and executive actions signal a
preference for the commercialization of research supported with
public funds.
The Bayh-Dole Act itself can be viewed as a source of coercive
isomorphism since its legislative history and purpose signal the
federal government’s interest in promoting university technology
transfer and commercialization. 164 Universities are thus likely to feel
obligated to maintain TTOs to support the goals of this important
federal legislation and demonstrate that they are good stewards of
federal research funding. Maintaining a TTO is important to ensure
adequate levels of federal research funding going forward and their
participation in CRADAs with federal agencies such as the National
Insitute of Health.
In the case of state universities, legislative pressure may exist if
performance funds are tied to metrics that include patenting and
technology transfer. For example, in Florida the legislature awards
university performance funding and preeminent university
classifications based on a variety of metrics, one of which is the
amount of patenting. 165
3.

Mimetic Isomorphism
The existence of TTOs can also be impacted by mimetic
isomorphism. 166 This third type of pressure arises from
uncertainty. 167 Since running a successful technology
commercialization program is rare and difficult, the uncertainty
levels are high. This uncertainty pressures institutions to imitate
See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999).
164
See Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER
93, 95 (2004) (describing the statements made by WARF’s Howard Bremer in
support of the proposed act); see Government Patent Policies: Institutional Patent
Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive
Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 373–80 (1978)
(statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Res. Found).
165
See FLA. STAT. § 1001.7065 (2017) (stating that a university’s attainment of
one hundred or more patents during the most recent 3-year period is one of the
metrics for establishing academic and research excellence standards).
166
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 151.
167
Id.
163
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successful programs to reduce risk and “play it safe.” This approach,
however, is an ineffective short-cut or heuristic since it
simplistically assumes that replicating a successful structure will
yield success. The result is that many governing university boards
ask themselves “[w]hy can’t our state university be just like [MIT]
or Stanford University and make technology transfer into a
profitable operation.” 168 As most TTOs demonstrate, however, the
act of establishing these offices does not automatically yield
success. Mimetic isomorphism can nonetheless be a powerful force.
As stated by one TTO director, universities invest in TTOs “to
dream big and discover the next [blockbuster].” 169
C. Expected Value Theory and Positive Spillovers
Universities behave rationally if one considers the expected
value of technology transfer. According to one study, the odds of a
blockbuster technology transfer event are positively correlated with
the size of the university’s research budget. 170 The size of the
university’s research budget is a predictor since more research
translates into more invention disclosures. The odds of a blockbuster
decrease dramatically, on the other hand, as research budgets
decrease. 171 Universities, however, may rationally view technology
transfer payoffs from an expected value standpoint. An expected
value multiplies the probability of an event, such as a blockbuster
patent, times the gains associated with that event. 172 Since the gains
of a blockbuster patent can reach billions of dollars, universities will
invest in technology transfer even if the odds are fairly low.
Lastly, universities may continue to spend on technology
transfer to achieve positive spillovers that are not properly
accounted for in a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis. Some
positive spillovers that occur from technology transfer are the ability
to strengthen industry and government agency relationships through
licensing, improved reputation among key stakeholders such as the
Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 297.
Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96.
170
VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 11–12.
171
Id.
172
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51,
51–63 (1977).
168
169
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community and alumni, the creation of spin-offs that may not
generate immediate licensing revenues, and the ability to obtain
funding from local, state and federal sources to create incubators and
research parks. 173
VI. THE TAXOL CASE
This part provides an empirical perspective of technology
transfer through a discussion of a blockbuster technology transfer
event at Florida State University (FSU). Although one single case
cannot provide conclusive or generalizable findings, this case has
high probative value since it involves a research-oriented university
with a sizeable research budget that remains in the laggard category
despite managing a blockbuster technology-transfer event. 174 The
Taxol case at FSU, therefore, provides a lens through which
technology transfer can be applied to many laggard organizations
with sizable research programs that aspire to develop leader TTO
programs. Data from the case includes archival sources, interviews,
and print publications.
A. Case Background
Prior to the arrival of FSU’s first TTO director Michael Devine
in 1987, FSU had only a handful of patents that provided negligible
licensing revenues. 175 The university had no formal TTO in place
until Devine’s arrival and one attorney was on staff to handle the
university’s entire technology transfer workload. 176 It can be fairly
stated that the university had no real antecedents or culture to
support technology transfer prior to Devine’s arrival. One day a
chemistry professor by the name of Dr. Robert Holton arrived at
VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 16.
FSU is classified as a “R1 Doctoral University” having the highest research
activity under the well-known and utilized Carnegie Classification of Institutions
of Higher Education. See Doctoral Universities, THE CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION
OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUC., http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/lookup/
srp.php?clq=%7B%22basic2005_ids%22%3A%2215%22%7D&start_page=sta
ndard.php&backurl=standard.php&limit=0,50 [https://perma.cc/GW2S-FNDU]
(last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
175
A search of patents registered to Florida State University prior to 1987 at
uspto.gov yielded only seven results.
176
Telephone Interview with Michael Devine, supra note 88.
173
174
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Devine’s office to discuss his patent applications related to the
synthesis and partial synthesis of the Taxol molecule that had
exhibited promise in cancer treatments. 177
The FSU Taxol case must be historically assessed in light of the
many significant antecedents that led to Dr. Holton’s breakthrough
inventions. First among these was that in the 1960’s a bark
derivative from the Pacific Yew tree known as Taxol was
discovered. 178 In 1965, Drs. Monroe Wall and Mansukh Wani,
located in the Research Triangle area of North Carolina had
collaborated with the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to identify
K172 as the substance in the Pacific Yew tree with cancer-fighting
properties. In 1971, these two scientists published Taxol’s molecular
structure in the Journal of the American Chemical Society. 179
In 1979, Dr. Susan B. Horwitz of the Albert Einstein Medical
College discovered and published the unique mechanisms in Taxol
that fight cancer cells in the journal Nature. 180 Her astonishing
findings related to Taxol’s unique anti-cancer fighting properties
created strong interest in the academic world. In 1982, Dr. Holton
wrote his first Taxol-related paper after receiving tenure at Virginia
Tech. Although he had expressed interest in pursuing Taxol-related
research during his early years as an academic, he viewed it as too
risky for someone who had not yet earned tenure. 181
In 1985, Dr. Holton followed his wife Dr. Marie Krafft, a rising
star in the field of synthetic organic chemistry to FSU. 182 During the
years 1984–1998 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved Taxol for Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials in humans. The drug
showed promise, however, 240 pounds of the drug would require
177

Id.
Kim MacQueen, From Lab to Market, vol. 6 FLA. ST. U. RES. REV. 5–7
(1995).
179
See Monroe E. Wall et al., Plant Antitumor Agents. I. The Isolation and
Structure of Camptothecin, a Novel Alkaloidal Leukemia and Tumor Inhibitor
from Camptotheca Acuminata, 88 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 3888, 3888–90
(1966).
180
Peter B. Schiff, Jane Fant, & Susan B. Horowitz, Promotion of
Microtubule Assembly In Vitro by Taxol, 277 NATURE 665, 665–667 (1979).
181
Frank Stephenson, A Tale of Taxol, 45 FLA. ST. U. RES. REV. (2002).
182
Id. at 8.
178
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felling 360,000 Pacific Yew trees. Conservationists voiced
opposition to these massive logging efforts and the sustainability of
producing the drug was called into question.
In 1988, the NCI had decided it needed to stop procuring Taxol
derived from Pacific Yew trees due to its high expense. Dr. Matthew
Suffness oversaw the NCI’s Taxol program and he contacted Dr.
Holton to persuade him to investigate a semi-synthesis to develop
Taxol in a lab to ensure adequate low-cost supply. Prior to this
important phone call, Holton had been primarily interested in a full
synthesis of the Taxol molecule, which was viewed as the academic
“Mount Everest” of synthetic chemistry. 183 Like most academic
researchers who operate within Bohr’s research quadrant, Holton
was not interested in the applied commercialization aspects of the
much more promising and economically feasible semi-synthesis
approach. 184 During that call with Suffness, Holton learned that
Taxol would likely become an approved drug. 185 Having learned
this, Holton then oriented his research efforts toward the Taxol
semi-synthesis. 186
In 1989, Holton’s team developed a cost-effective Taxol semisynthesis. 187 That year the NCI had signed a cooperative research
and development agreement (CRADA) with Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS), assigning them exclusive rights to commercialize Taxol for
anti-cancer therapies. 188 In 1990, BMS then signed an exclusive
patent license with FSU to use Dr. Holton’s patented inventions
related to the Taxol semi-synthesis. 189 In 1993, BMS introduced
Taxol to the market and used Dr. Holton’s commercially-efficient
synthesis method. 190 By 1999, Dr. Holton’s lab at FSU had generated
nearly 60 patents and just one year later BMS Taxol-related sales

Id. at 9.
See supra text on p. 18.
185
Stephenson, supra note 181, at 9–10.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
JORDAN GOODMAN & VIVIEN WALSH, THE STORY OF TAXOL – NATURE AND
POLITICS IN THE PURSUIT OF AN ANTI-CANCER DRUG 157–59 (2001).
189
MacQueen, supra note 178, at 2.
190
Stephenson, supra note 181, at 7.
183
184

156

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 1

reached $1.6 billion. 191 In total, FSU received nearly $350 million
dollars in Taxol-related royalties. 192
B. Taxol Technology Transfer Success Factors
Findings from this case illustrate that each of the following were
important factors that yielded a highly unusual and successful
technology transfer event at FSU, a laggard TTO institution.
1.

A Problem Looking for a Solution
The Taxol case was unique since the scientific and
commercialization challenges were well-defined a priori. A semisynthesis of Taxol was necessary to ensure a reliable and costeffective supply of the compound. 193 Taxol, as the FDA clinical
trials had already demonstrated, evidenced strong promise as an
anti-cancer medication. 194 This scenario contrasts with many other
academic inventions, which rarely have a clear commercial solution
to an identified problem in the marketplace. In many instances,
academic inventions are solutions looking for a problem whereas the
Taxol case involved the opposite, a problem looking for a solution.
This somewhat singular aspect of the Taxol case may help explain
why FSU has not achieved anything remotely similar in terms of
patent commercialization and why it remains in the laggard TTO
category.
2.
Depth of Relational Capital with Key External
Stakeholders
Another key insight taken from the case is that technology and
innovation do not occur in a vacuum. 195 Dr. Holton’s Taxol semisynthesis required deep collaborations with partners within and
Id. at 12.
See Leonora LaPeter, Keep Your Millions, FSU Tells Professor, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Dec. 25, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/12/25/State/
Keep_your_millions__F.shtml [https://perma.cc/8PKR-PXXZ].
193
GOODMAN & WALSH, supra note 188, at 178.
194
Stephenson, supra note 181, at 7.
195
See Jasjit Singh & Lee Fleming, Lone Inventors as Sources of
Breakthroughs: Myth or Reality?, 56 MGMT. SCI. 41, 48–49 (2010) (finding
empirical evidence that supports the notion that individuals, especially those
without affiliation to organizations, are less likely to achieve breakthroughs and
more likely to invent particularly poor outcomes).
191
192
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external to his lab. These external partnerships included the NCI
which spent millions of dollars funding his Taxol-related research.
External collaborations crossed over into industry with the CRADA
executed between the NCI and BMS and also the license agreement
executed between FSU and BMS. The lesson is that relationship
capital with key external stakeholders in the private and public
sectors should be a foundational element of any successful
technology transfer strategy. 196 Likewise, the prompting by Suffness
at the NCI that motivated Holton to approach the problem from an
applied commercialization perspective highlights how external
partners can be important information conduits and unexpected
motivators. It was Suffness at the NCI who motivated Dr. Holton to
shift his research focus and move from Bohr’s quadrant to Pascal’s
quadrant. 197
3.

The Inspired and Motivated Academic Inventor
Dr. Holton was initially intrigued by the challenge of achieving
a full synthesis of Taxol. 198 That is where his original research
passion and drive resided. 199 This emphasis on basic research is
characteristic of academic researchers and scientists. 200 Holton was
able to cross into the practical dimension of the problem once he
was motivated to do so by his momentous phone call with Suffness
at the NCI. This process illustrates how he migrated closer into
Pascal’s quadrant of applied research. 201 Prior to the phone call with
Suffness, Holton was skeptical that Taxol could be commercialized
as a drug. As Holton recalled, “[Suffness] knew what the story was
better than anybody. He said ‘Bob, this one’s gonna be a drug, and

This view is supported by Lee, supra note 49, at 1522 (“Given the scarcity
of potential suitors for university inventions, personal relationships are critical to
identifying licensees.”).
197
Stephenson, supra note 181, at 9–10.
198
Id. at 9.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 8–10.
201
Id.; see also GOODMAN & WALSH, supra note 188, at 178 (“Holton agreed
in 1988, ‘the need to do something of some practical significance, the opportunity
to do something that was really needed and happened to be right on my doorstep’
caused him to turn his attention towards a commercial practical route to Taxol.”).
196
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somebody’s gotta figure out how to make it.’ After that call, I
realized I needed to change my way of thinking.” 202
This suggests that some successful technology transfer activities
require deep levels of engagement and commitment from academic
inventors. Studies show that tacit knowledge gained from relational
forms of governance, for example consulting engagements, are
positively associated with successful cases of university technology
transfer. 203 Relational engagements such as consulting or technical
assistance are more likely to emerge, however, when academic
inventors are passionate about the practical dimensions of their
research. This passion can emerge from various sources. For Dr.
Holton, it was the call from Dr. Suffness urging him to turn a dream
into a reality that would result in saving many lives. For Dr.
Steenbok, the University of Wisconsin professor, inventor, and cofounder of WARF it was his desire to promote improved nutrition
and ensure that his technology would be widely distributed to the
public in a safe, ethical, and responsible manner. 204 Passion of this
sort that extends beyond the financial rewards of licensing is likely
an important motivator to encourage the academic inventor to shift
into Pascal’s quadrant and work with industry to advance the
commercial and socio-ethical aspects of technology.
4.

The Role of Serendipity and Organizational Learning
An aspect that is often overlooked in technology transfer is the
important role of serendipity. According to Mike Devine’s recalling
of the Taxol case:
This was serendipity. Bob was the right person at the
right time. And I was the right person at the right time
to help get this invention licensed, and I respected
him. NCI already had the BMS contract [CRADA].
FSU had nothing to do with the fact that it sold a
billion dollars a year. 205

Stephenson, supra note 181, at 10.
Lee, supra note 49, at 1551.
204
Apple, supra note 53, at 377.
205
Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88.
202
203
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Dr. Holton likewise described the Taxol case as a fortunate
incident when he stated: “[w]e got lucky that all this money came to
us.” 206 Serendipity has played an important role in other high-profile
university technology commercialization success stories.
Northwestern University’s blockbuster discovery of pregabalin was
later described as a “serendipitous discovery.” In that case, the
academic inventor “had no idea that one molecule he made would
ever be useful for anything.” 207
An appreciation of the role of serendipity introduces a level of
realism to technology transfer dialogues and mitigates the
misconceived notion that every invention will be a blockbuster, or
that the TTO should consistently operate as a profit center. That does
not mean that luck alone will dictate results, as if a lottery system
were in effect. The Taxol case illustrates that important success
factors such as increased research budgets, key external
partnerships, and enhanced motivation driving the academic
inventor can increase the odds, albeit low, of achieving a
blockbuster event.
Serendipity is likely to play a much greater role, however, in
laggard institutions that lack extensive research budgets and the
path-dependent capabilities of leader institutions. 208 Path
dependence has been defined by scholars as a process that includes
singular historical events, which may under certain conditions
transform themselves into self-reinforcing dynamics that generate
lock-in or persistence over time. 209 For example, some of the
capabilities that likely contribute to TTO success are effective
knowledge management and entrepreneurialism. 210 These unique
LaPeter, supra note 192.
Peter Kotecki, As Lyrica profits dry up, Northwestern seeks another
‘blockbuster’ drug, DAILY NW. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://dailynorthwestern.com/
2016/04/10/in-focus/in-focus-as-lyrica-profits-dry-up-northwestern-seeksanother-blockbuster-drug/ [https://perma.cc/AZ6H-QN4Q].
208
See Jörg Sydow et al., Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the Black
Box, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 689, 689 (2009) (defining path-dependence as selfreinforcing mechanisms, which are likely to lead an organization into a lock-in
stage).
209
Id.
210
See Andrew H. Gold et al., Knowledge Management: An Organizational
Capabilities Perspective, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 185 (2001).
206
207
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capabilities seem to be present due to the efforts of key individuals
who succeed in transforming the cultural and intellectual
competencies of TTOs. The success of these efforts is retained
within leader organizations and persist over time in a pathdependent manner. The lack of learning within FSU’s TTO, on the
other hand, was apparent since knowledge of the Taxol case was
insufficiently maintained within that office. The author, for
example, requested the Taxol license agreements between BMS and
FSU. No one within the TTO had retained these important
documents. An old incomplete draft agreement was eventually
retrieved from an off-campus warehouse. This indicates that the
TTO has not maintained a data repository related to the most
successful TTO event within that organization’s history. 211 Lacking
this important historical data creates a learning deficit for future
TTO negotiations. In essence, the lack of institutional knowledge
about that past success of Taxol is indicative of a dearth at FSU of
the market-focused, entrepreneurial-spirited TTO culture that
characterizes leader institutions.
C. Summary of the Taxol Case Findings
It is tempting to view the Taxol case as further evidence of BayhDole’s success. Yet, the evidence indicates that this event was
somewhat of an anomaly and that laggard universities are influenced
by normative pressures and play a probabilistic game that can
sometimes yield positive results from the expected value theory of
technology transfer. The institutional pressure for FSU to continue
patenting remains high. The university aspires, for example, to the
join the elite grouping of AAU-member institutions. Seventeen of
the twenty leader TTOs belong to this prestigious association. 212
Also, the Florida Legislature uses patenting as a metric in its yearly
performance funding allocations. As the university’s research
profile and budget increases, it will likely use patent metrics to

The lack of institutional learning and data management presents a barrier to
institutional effectiveness. Id.
212
See supra Table 3.
211
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signal its commitment to research and to demonstrate the impact its
research has on society. 213
Patenting has generated positive spillovers at the university. As
a result of the hundreds of millions of dollars generated by Taxol,
the FSU Research Foundation is flush with resources. 214 This helps
support university-related projects, such as endowed professorships
and capital expenditure projects that involve STEM-based research
labs. 215 Yet, to maximize the chances of future success, FSU’s TTO
will likely have to strengthen its knowledge management practices.
Further empirical studies may demonstrate that the Bayh-Dole
Act simply strengthened the hand of universities such as Stanford,
MIT, and the University of Wisconsin that already had a pathdependent technology commercialization capability.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act stimulated university patenting and
licensing. Several negative and unintended consequences have
emerged in light of the statute, however, that present a problem from
a public policy standpoint. These include: A) universities
increasingly engaging in predatory behavior that mimics private
industry; and B) the disproportionate concentration of wealth and
success among leader institutions. If left unmitigated, these negative
consequences may threaten to overshadow the success of Bayh-Dole
and can trigger calls for legislative reform. Efforts to reform or
weaken Bayh-Dole in turn may kill the proverbial goose that lays
the golden eggs. This part will address these dangers and offer
prescriptive solutions to address them.

See Dave Heller, FSU Ranked Among World’s Top Patent-Producing
Universities, FLA. ST. U. NEWS (June 6, 2017), http://news.fsu.edu/news/
university-news/2017/06/06/fsu-ranked-among-worlds-top-patent-producinguniversities/ [https://perma.cc/3VBJ-6C8B].
214
The FSU Research Foundation’s current assets for the fiscal year ended 2017
totaled $143 million. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS JUNE 30, 2017 AND 2016.
215
Id.
213
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A. University Predatory Practices
University administrators are guardians of the broad publicoriented missions of universities. Sometimes, this purpose clashes
with the narrower financial interests of privately funded research.
For example, in some cases, industry requires secrecy, and this may
prevent the academic inventor from sharing their findings with the
broader scientific community. There have been troubling instances
where industry stifles discussion if the academic findings they have
sponsored are contrary to their financial interests. 216 For example,
corporate sponsors may stifle debate and disclosure through the use
of restrictive confidentiality agreements that prevent academic
researchers from speaking about their findings.217 In some disturbing
instances, private parties may litigate or threaten to sue to intimidate
and harass academic researchers. 218 Administrators must preserve
the unique and open culture of universities and guard against overlyaggressive or predatory patenting and licensing practices even if it
means sacrificing short-term financial research commitments or
taking a hard stance against corporate sponsors.
The successful commercialization of university inventions has
generated unexpected conflicts. For example, universities have
increasingly been parties to patent litigation. Recently, state
universities have purchased patents from companies and granted
exclusive licenses back to those companies. This is done to assert
sovereign immunity against parties who seek to challenge the
patents in administrative proceedings. 219 This calls into question
216
See Nicolas Bagley et al., Scientific Trials-In the Laboratories, not the
Courts, JAMA INTERNAL MED. E1–E2 (2017) (discussing several incidences
where companies used legal means and the threat of expensive, embarrassing and
protracted litigation to stifle or silence academic research findings); David
Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 137, 168 (2016) (stating
that something similar occurs when “[i]n some cases, companies attempt to
restrict consumers from posting truthful reviews online by adding nondisparagement clauses into contracts with customers.”).
217
Hakim, supra note 29.
218
Bagley et al., supra note 216.
219
See Dennis Crouch, Sovereign Immunity Excuses University of Florida from
IPR Challenge, PATENTLY–O BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/
patent/2017/02/sovereign-university-challenge.html
[https://perma.cc/FTZ6NHP4].
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whether state universities should offer their sovereign immunity for
sale. 220 In other cases, universities have been derisively labeled
patent trolls due to their aggressive patent assertions and litigation
postures. For example, in December 2012, Carnegie Mellon
University was awarded a $1.17 billion jury verdict in a patent
infringement suit against Marvell Technology Group. 221 WARF has
likewise drawn criticism due to its aggressive litigation and large
patent verdicts. In October 2015, a jury awarded WARF $234
million against Apple, Inc. in a patent lawsuit. 222
This behavior has led the AAU to issue a report related to
universities that litigate patents and recommends several best
practices such as restraint, cooperation, and using patents to promote
public welfare. 223 The report, for example, advises universities to
avoid selling patents to patent trolls and to employ non-exclusive
licenses. 224 The AAU’s recommendations are sound since Congress
may decide, in light of the negative consequences associated with
university patenting, to revisit Bayh-Dole or implement other
legislation that restricts university technology transfer. All
universities, leaders and laggards, should adopt and implement these
recommendations as a code of conduct and best practices to be
followed by university research foundations and TTOs.
See Mark D. Shelley, II et al., State Sovereignty 101: State Universities not
Immune to IPR Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. (June 17, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-sovereignty-101-state-universitiesnot-immune-to-ipr-proceedings [https://perma.cc/ABM3-NYYJ].
221
Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Dec. 27, 2012), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/education/
2012/12/27/Carnegie-Mellon-wins-1-17-billion-in-patent-case/stories/
201212270173 [https://perma.cc/YQP6-JJAZ].
222
See Joe Nocera, The Patent Troll Smokescreen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/opinion/the-patent-troll-smokescreen.html
[https://perma.cc/W5NE-RV29] (asking whether WARF is a patent troll).
223
AAU Working Grp. on Tech. Transfer & Intellectual Prop., Statement to the
AAU Membership on University Technology Transfer and Managing Intellectual
Property
in
the
Public
Interest,
AUTM
(Mar.
2015)
https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/AAU_Working
_Group_Managing_University_IP_MAR2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RJJFVZ5].
224
Id. (recommending universities to establish policies restricting work with
so-called patent trolls).
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University administrators may also be tempted to treat research
as simply a means to achieve commercialization success and muchneeded funds. Given its highly uncertain nature, however, it would
be risky to view technology transfer as a remedy against falling
appropriations or dwindling tuition revenues. If anything,
technology transfer should be treated as one element of a much
larger strategy that involves funding sources and external
stakeholder engagement. According to Mike Devine, FSU’s former
TTO director, “[i]f the purpose of the TTO is to make money, you’re
going to be seriously disappointed.” 225 University administrators,
nonetheless, may be tempted to see TTOs as a means to increase
their institutional profiles and endowments in light of a few
blockbuster examples. 226
Another danger facing university administrators is the
temptation to place too much emphasis on certain areas of academic
research that have an applied commercial focus. For example, a
good deal of research in natural sciences consists of basic research,
whereas other fields such as medicine naturally favor applied
science. 227 It may be tempting for policymakers and university
administrators to favor certain disciplines over others in terms of
faculty hiring or research funding commitments. This could distort
the traditional university model of cooperation and support across
departmental units. The danger is real since a university association
recently recommended that technology transfer be included within
faculty tenure and promotion criteria. 228 This type of short-sighted
policy could have drastic and negative consequences for the
collaborative spirit of universities and their mission to promote basic
research and scholarly inquiry.

Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88.
Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 297.
227
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 20.
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Colleen Flaherty, University Group Pushes ‘Technology Transfer’ in
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B. Skewed Value Distribution
The skewed distribution of TTO success among leaders is also
problematic and contrary to the spirit of Bayh-Dole as a federal act.
If left unabated, the public trust in the efficacy of Bayh-Dole may
be eroded due to the perception that very few elite institutions with
large endowments are the ones benefitting from this statutory
scheme at the expense of the public and taxpayer support. It is
therefore, incumbent upon leader organizations to share best
practices with laggard institutions to disseminate knowledge of
ways to capitalize on technology commercialization. Since it
appears that leaders have path-dependent capabilities that allow
them to continually place within the leader category, there are
unique internal practices that yield success and these should be more
broadly discussed and disseminated through professional
associations and conferences.
For example, some leader TTOs provide incentives to increase
their human capital. 229 A more enlightened management approach
could also emphasize smaller and medium-sized transactions that
generate trust with commercial partners, facilitate learning and
increase deal flow. Relying on a blockbuster event is speculative and
as the Taxol case demonstrates it does not necessarily promote
learning or provide the foundation for future success. A suitable
forum for disseminating these best practices may be an organization
like AUTM, where TTO managers converge within a professional
association. Leader organizations should take a proactive role to
diffuse best practices so that more TTOs are at least financially selfsufficient and in a better position to achieve licensing opportunities
and success.
The failure to address this concern may spark calls to limit
university technology transfer or place a tax on this activity. It is
worth noting that the original version of the bill included provisions
designed to defuse criticism that it would lead to profiteering at the
expense of the public interest. This included a recoupment provision
requiring that universities pay back a share of licensing income to
funding agencies. 230 The final version of the Bayh-Dole Act
229
230

Osenga, supra note 19, at 419.
MOWERY, supra note 43.
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eliminated this provision since “there was no agreement on whether
the funds would be returned to the agencies or to general revenue,
or how the collection and auditing functions would be conducted”
and “fears that the costs of the infrastructure required to administer
such a program would exceed the amounts collected.” 231
VIII. CONCLUSION
Universities are unique environments that thrive on the research
activities of faculty and students. A substantial amount of innovation
results from the creative endeavors of these individuals. To
disseminate knowledge and potentially derive lucrative sources of
funding, universities have entered the field of technology
commercialization and patenting. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act
was instrumental to encourage this activity and the result has been
an explosion of university-related patenting and licensing.
Thirty-nine years have passed since the passage of the BayhDole Act. On the whole, the statute’s purpose has been fulfilled
regarding the increased rates of patent commercialization of
federally-sponsored research at U.S.-based universities. 232 Indeed,
the biotechnology industry is largely a product of the statute’s
success. 233 That is not to say, however, that negative unintended
consequences did not arise. Notably, the statute has reified the
success at a few elite institutions with path-dependent capabilities
and labeled here as leaders in the technology transfer field. Laggard
institutions attempt to mimic the leaders’ success and institutional
theory explains why so many laggards do this despite having low
probabilities of achieving success. In some isolated examples,
serendipity plays a large role in blockbuster events, such as the case
of FSU with its blockbuster Taxol semi-synthesis patents.
Several policy implications arise from the analysis of universitybased technology transfer from the perspective of TTOs. First,
technology transfer should not be viewed narrowly in terms of

231
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Kesan, supra note 12, at 2178.
233
Eberle, supra note 36.
232
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financial costs and benefits. 234 It is clear that technology transfer
yields positive spillovers that extend beyond licensing revenues. 235
For example, technology transfer has an important signaling role
since it allows universities to highlight their commitment to research
advancement as well as the positive impact of the university’s
research on society. 236 Second, two major negative and unintended
consequences of Bayh-Dole include the increasingly predatory
commercial behavior of universities and the skewed value
distribution of TTO success. To address these concerns university
administrators who are the trustees and gatekeepers of publicoriented institutions must recognize the negative consequences of
this behavior and adopt policies that prioritize the public missions
of universities. Finally, to address the skewed value distribution,
leader TTOs should take a more active role disseminating best
practices among laggard TTOs to avoid the perception of unfair and
ineffective technology transfer outcomes.

See Kesan, supra note 12, at 2188 (stating that “TTOs cannot be justified
simply on financial terms”).
235
Osenga, supra note 19.
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See Maryann Feldman et al., Equity and the Technology Transfer Strategies
of American Research Universities, 48 MGMT. SCI. 105, 108 (2002).
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